

1. Teach-ins reflected understandable concern and puzzlement: concern about a US involvement that had led the President to accept the risks of a widened war, and to commit US ground troops in Asia; puzzlement about the nature of the stakes for the US in a conflict on the other side of the world, a conflict with many of the earmarks of a civil war. Why is it the business of the US to be engaged in that struggle? Why is it so important that we must take such steps?

2. Is the US really committed? Legally, morally? (Morgenthau: like a commitment by a parent to a child...not like a contract between equals.)

Must we assume that the Communist Bloc is monolithic, or uniformly aggressive?

Will the consequences of a Comm victory in SVN be like upsetting dominoes?

Can our efforts succeed: aren't we fighting ~~on the unpopular~~ on the unpopular side in a civil war, against the wishes of the mass of the people? Are our measures against the North--and our offers to negotiate with the North--irrelevant to the struggle in the South?

(Doesn't the very success of the VC in the South show that the masses of the people support them; and that help from the North, or control, is insignificant?)

3. Teach-ins started as pure protest; simple assumption that government policies were wrong, misguided, simplistic, based on myths. ~~But they changed~~ They changed in the direction of genuine dialog; even though they tended to be weighted on the side of critics of government policy, students were exposed to exposition and discussion of considerations underlying policy.

a) "Now I'm confused."

b) Spectacle of government official reasoning, discussing alternatives, admitting uncertainties, controversy, difficulties of decision. Perhaps we too often give impression that we see problems as simple, that the policies we are following are the only possible ones; that may not inspire confidence in that part of the public that follows matters closely enough to find them confusing, that sees a variety of conflicting considerations and possible, opposing courses of action.

4. I was, like some others, forced to be a drop-out from the National Teach-in. Perhaps today I can take this opportunity to address some of the questions and concerns revealed by those debates.

5. (End of school year means many things. I'm sure members of graduating class regard it with mixed feelings. To an official of the government, who spends a large part of his time on SVN, it means the end of a season of teach-ins on Viet-nam. I may be speaking prematurely; perhaps, with vacation days coming, we should be preparing for a series of Marches on Washington. But I think that most of the tired people who closed up the National Teach-in in Washington in the early hours of May 16 had made a private decision that their own need to discuss this particular subject all night had been largely satisfied.

Looking back on the mutiny

1. What business has US in VN (Far East)
no matter who is in North & S area.
2. Why pick on DRV; they not doing anything.
3. Why oppose VC; they are goodies.

A. ~~Did~~ ~~we~~ US intervene if no
external supply — i.e.,
if uprising (revolt) indigenous.

B. Must the rebels be "vulnerable" —
i.e., threaten to cause trouble
later outside their borders.

C. Is it important that an indigenous
~~up~~ revolt is likely to be
time "taken over" by the communists

D. Do we object to communism or to
expansionism, esp. by USSR &
China.

E. Would we oppose Red take over if
naturally wanted it (do we object on having them over?)
a chance to win them over?

F. How critical is it that we are on the line
against a take over